Corporate managers and executive compensation in many industries place signi…cant emphasis on measures of …rm size, such as sales revenue or market share. Such objectives have an important -yet thus far unquanti…ed -impact on market performance. With n symmetric …rms, equilibrium welfare losses are of order 1=n 4 , and thus vanish extremely quickly. Welfare losses are less than 5% for many empirically relevant market structures, despite signi…cant …rm asymmetry and industry concentration. They can be estimated using only basic information on market shares. These results also apply to oligopsonistic competition (e.g., for retail bank deposits) and strategic forward trading (e.g., in restructured electricity markets).
Introduction
For imperfectly competitive markets, the pro…t-maximization hypothesis (see, e.g., Alchian, 1950 and Friedman, 1953) lacks the strong foundation that it enjoys under perfect competition. Firms'strategic departures from pro…t-maximization have important consequences for market performance. This paper shows that welfare losses due to imperfect competition are often small when …rms (or their managers) pursue additional objectives such as sales revenue or market share. For example, in a symmetric linear duopoly, equilibrium welfare losses are only 4 percent. In other words, 96 percent of the maximum possible social surplus is realized even in a highly concentrated market with only two sellers.
Welfare losses due to imperfect competition have received much attention from economists, especially since Harberger's (1954) controversial estimate that deadweight losses from monopoly power in U.S. manufacturing are less than 0.1 percent of GNP. While some other empirical studies have obtained similar estimates, others have found that welfare losses are signi…cantly higher in the range of 4 to 7 percent of GNP or above (see, e.g., Cowling and Mueller, 1978) . As a result, there has been considerable debate about the appropriate empirical methodology to estimate welfare losses, and, relatedly, about the limitations of available industry data (especially on …rm pro…ts).
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More recently, on the theoretical side, Anderson and Renault (2003) examine welfare losses under Cournot competition (with symmetric …rms and homogeneous products), and provide bounds in terms of the number of …rms in the market and demand conditions. Corchón (2008) shows that, although welfare losses are typically quite small for Cournot competition with symmetric …rms, they can be much larger when …rms have asymmetric costs.
Existing contributions to the literature assume either explicitly or implicitly that …rms are pro…t-maximizers. However, extensive evidence suggests that, in practice, managers also place much emphasis on measures of their …rm's size, such as sales revenue or market share. For example, competition for rankings in "league tables" -based on size rather than pro…ts -plays an important role in many sectors.
In the banking industry, information providers such as Thomson Financial and Dealogic compile league tables based on the dollar volume of sales (rather than pro…tability) for di¤erent lines of business such as syndicated loans, initial public o¤erings, and mergers & acquisitions. Industry reports make it plain that league table rankings are a signi…cant source of managerial utility, and that banks are 1 See Scherer and Ross (1990) for a detailed overview of this literature.
willing to sacri…ce pro…ts to improve their position. 2 The rivalry between Airbus and Boeing in aircraft manufacturing focuses heavily on the volume of plane orders and deliveries, with former Airbus chairman Alan Boyd admitting to a strategy of "pricing for market share" (Yo¢ e, 1991) . General Electric famously pursued for many years the objective of being the largest or second-largest …rm (by sales) in each of its businesses. Similar objectives also feature prominently in the semiconductor, automotive, and computer industries, as well as in competition between stock exchanges. 3 Moreover, there is substantial evidence that executive compensation is positively tied to …rm size (in addition to pro…ts). Such a relationship has been found to hold empirically across many di¤erent countries and over time, for both manufacturing and service industries (see, e.g., Murphy, 1999 and Rosen, 1992) and in the banking sector (see, e.g., Hubbard and Palia, 1995) . Perhaps one of the earliest examples of the impact of revenue-based managerial incentive contracts on competition comes from the Dutch East India Company in the 17 th century (Irwin, 1991) .
The separation of ownership and control can function as a strategic commitment to aggressive behaviour in product markets. In particular, it can be a pro…t-maximizing strategy for a …rm's shareholders to use incentive contracts that reward sales revenue in addition to pro…ts (see Vickers, 1985 and Judd, 1987) . 4 Thus, the industry ends up in a prisoners'dilemma: Collectively, it would be better o¤ under pro…t-maximization but, individually, it is in each …rm's interest to use sales incentives. 5 An alternative interpretation of these models is that managers propose such product-market strategies to shareholders, and the capital market selects among competing proposals.
2 For example, a recent press comment notes that "rival investment banks will now be carefully assessing whether to try and muscle in ... in order not to miss out on the fees and the valuable league table credit so beloved of banks'marketing departments"(Financial Times, 1 March 2010), while another concludes "it is time the banks stopped being so obsessed with league tables and concentrated on generating revenues for their own shareholders" (Financial Times, 22 April 2007) . 3 See, e.g., The Economist, 2 April 2009 on competitive conditions in semiconductors, Ritz (2008) on incentives and compensation in the automotive industry, Berkson, Maged, Shah and Tantzen (1997) on sales objectives in the U.S. computer industry, and Capaldo, Härle and Marrs (2008) on competition between stock exchanges. 4 These build on the insights of Schelling (1960) on the value of third-party commitment and on the game-theoretical results of d 'Aspremont and Gérard-Varet (1980) . The result that managers' incentive contracts reward sales revenue relies on competition between …rms being in strategic substitutes (as is typically the case in Cournot markets). 5 Other models in which size matters include those with switching costs and network e¤ects; see Farrell and Klemperer (2007) for a recent survey. In contrast to strategic incentives, these tend to revolve around intertemporal aspects of pricing and production. Moreover, size components enter directly into a …rm's value function, so it is not clear why managerial incentives are separately based on sales revenue. See also Zábojnik (1998) for a model in which sales incentives help strengthen employee investment in speci…c human capital.
How large are welfare losses due to imperfect competition when …rms employ strategic incentives? While it is well-known that such departures from pro…t-maximization lead to lower prices, only very little attention has been paid to actually quantifying their welfare impact.
This paper shows that, in the case with n symmetric …rms, welfare losses are of order 1=n 4 , and thus vanish extremely quickly. With at least three symmetric …rms, welfare losses are always less than 1 percent. So over 99 percent of maximum possible social surplus is realized in the incentive equilibrium (see Proposition 2). Amongst other things, this result closely matches Bresnahan and Reiss's (1991) empirical …nding that entry beyond a third …rm has virtually no further e¤ect on the competitiveness of a market. With asymmetric …rms, welfare losses are higher because an ine¢ ciently large fraction of industry output is produced by high-cost/low-quality …rms. However, with equilibrium incentives, an additional e¢ ciency e¤ect arises compared to pro…t maximization: Since competition is more intense under delegation, …rms with lower costs (or higher product quality) capture larger market shares than in standard Cournot markets. Put di¤erently, for a weaker …rm to sustain a given -empirically observed -market share, its disadvantage relative to other …rms must be smaller under delegation. This e¤ect very signi…cantly limits deadweight losses due to imperfect competition.
Incorporating …rms'strategic incentives, welfare losses due to imperfect competition are below 5 percent for many empirically relevant market structures -despite signi…cant …rm asymmetry and industry concentration. For example, a simple suf…cient condition for welfare losses to be less than 5 percent is that the market share of the largest …rm in the industry does not exceed 35 percent (see Proposition 4).
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Welfare losses are also small if …rms'unit costs and product qualities are su¢ ciently similar, or if there are su¢ ciently many …rms in the industry (see Proposition 3).
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The paper derives these results based on a formula for equilibrium welfare losses that uses only basic information on the distribution of …rms' market shares (see Proposition 1). Such industry data are often readily available to the analyst, making it straightforward to put the formula into practice and estimate welfare losses for a particular industry.
These results apply to a range of other settings in which competition between …rms shares the same underlying strategic properties. For instance, they apply equally to oligopsonistic markets in which managers pursue strategic incentives. One topical example is competition between commercial banks for retail deposits (one of their core business activities). There is a strong policy interest in the market structure of the banking sector following the 2007-9 …nancial crisis. 8 The results presented in this paper can be used to estimate welfare losses in a standard model of deposit market competition, based on the observed distribution of banks'market shares. A further application is the impact of forward trading on market performance, which has recently received much attention in restructured electricity markets in the U.K. and several U.S. states (see, e.g., Green, 1999 and Bushnell, Mansur and Saravia, 2008) . This paper shows that the seminal two-period forward contracting model due to Allaz and Vila (1993) is strategically equivalent to the two-stage model of managerial delegation. Propositions 1 to 4 thus directly quantify equilibrium welfare losses, and provide conditions under which deadweight losses with strategic forward contracting are less than 5 percent. This contrasts with much of the existing empirical literature on deregulated electricity markets that focuses on estimating price-cost margins (Lerner indices) as a proxy for welfare losses due to market power.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the benchmark model, and Section 3 derives its equilibrium conditions. Section 4 presents a formula for equilibrium welfare losses. Section 5 discusses the case with symmetric …rms, while Section 6 analyzes the model with asymmetric …rms. Section 7 presents applications to competition between oligopsonists and strategic forward trading.
Section 8 discusses several extensions. Extension A considers non-linear demand curves, and Extension B covers settings where entering …rms incur a …xed setup cost. These show that the basic insights from the analysis -and the 5 percent upper bound on welfare losses -extend well beyond the benchmark model. Extension C analyzes a general model with non-linear demand curves, a …xed setup cost, and a generalized welfare function that may place greater weight on consumer welfare. Using an equilibrium formula for generalized welfare losses (see Proposition 5), it shows that losses tend to zero if either the number of …rms grows large or if …rms' demand curves are su¢ ciently convex (see Proposition 6).
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Section 9 o¤ers concluding remarks. 8 For example, there are concerns about competition in the U.K. banking sector, notably since the merger of HBOS and Lloyds TSB (two of the largest commercial banks) in late 2008. 9 This extension also shows that -in contrast to standard Cournot competition -it is not possible to construct examples in which (generalized) welfare losses are arbitrarily close to 100 percent in settings where …rms pursue strategic incentives.
Benchmark model
Industry parameters. Consider an industry with n 2 quantity-setting …rms. Firm j has unit cost c j , produces output x j , and has market share j = x j =X (where X P n j=1 x j is industry output). Let c min min j c j denote the lowest unit cost, and let max max j j denote the highest market share.
On the demand side, consumer utility is given by
Letting p j denote …rm j's price, utility maximization yields a linear inverse demand curve for …rm j,
where j is a measure of demand for …rm j's product and s > 0 is a measure of market size.
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This setup allows for both cost asymmetry (in the c j s) and demand asymmetry (in the j s) between …rms. Demand asymmetry can be interpreted as re ‡ecting di¤erences in product quality, that is, as vertical product di¤erentiation. Thereby, consumers have a higher willingness-to-pay for a higher-quality product.
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It will be useful to let j ( j c j ) > 0 denote a pro…tability index for …rm j, and also let max max j j . All else equal, a …rm will be more pro…table if it has higher product quality or lower unit costs.
Strategic incentives. Firms delegate decision-making in the product market to their managers. Manager j maximizes
a weighted average of …rm pro…ts j = (p j c j ) x j and sales revenue R j = p j x j . The game has two stages. In the …rst stage, each …rm's shareholders choose the incentive weight j to maximize their …rm's pro…ts j . In the second stage, each …rm's manager chooses an output level x j to maximize his objective j .
Managers'payo¤s are held to their outside option (which is normalized to zero), 10 The main implication of the linear demand structure is that competition is in strategic substitutes, so …rms want to commit to more rather than less aggressive behaviour in product markets. See Extensions A and C in Section 8 for further analysis with non-linear demand systems.
11 For example, some computers (or computer parts) are more reliable than others (even though they may all be functionally almost identical), some …nancial institutions provide a faster or more e¢ cient service than others, and di¤erent quality grades exist for numerous "commodity"products such as aluminium, cement, crude oil, and steel. so all rents accrue to shareholders. This paper follows the applied literature in assuming that such product-market incentives form a credible commitment. A su¢ cient condition for this is that managers' contracts are observable and non-renegotiable. The standard justi…cation, given by Fershtman and Judd (1987) , is that incentive contracts, in practice, are in force for substantial periods of time, and that …rms and managers eventually learn about the prevailing incentive structure in their industry.
However, commitment value can obtain more generally in some settings. For example, in an important paper, Caillaud, Jullien and Picard (1995) show that (only) precommitments towards more aggressive behaviour -as considered in the present analysis -may be credible even when renegotiation is allowed.
12 See, e.g., Fershtman and Kalai (1997) , Katz (1991 Katz ( , 2006 , and Koçkesen and Ok (2004) for further discussion and analysis of conditions under which credible commitments are possible.
Social welfare. Social welfare is de…ned as the sum of consumer and producer surplus, W (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = [U (x 1 ; :::; x n ) P n j=1 p j x j ] + P n j=1 j , or equivalently
The marginal social surplus for product j is @W=@x j = j X=s. Thus, "…rst-best" social welfare involves industry output X F B = s max and so
The highest possible social welfare is achieved where all industry output is produced by the …rm with the highest pro…tability index max (that is, the highest di¤erence between product quality and unit cost). With symmetric product qualities (so j = for all j), there is a single market price that in …rst-best is equal to the unit cost of the most e¢ cient …rm, p = c min .
The main objective of the analysis is to quantify the (percentage) welfare loss due to imperfect competition,
which is also known as the relative deadweight loss; see, e.g., Tirole (1988) .
12 However, Reitman (1993) shows that non-linear incentives derived from stock options can mitigate -and sometimes even fully o¤set -the pro-competitive e¤ect of strategic incentives.
Equilibrium conditions
The game is solved backwards for the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Manager j's …rst-order condition in stage two (taking the incentive weight j as given) is
This condition implicitly de…nes manager j's best response in the product market. The Nash equilibrium of the stage occurs where all managers are simultaneously playing their best responses. Thus let x j ( 1 ; :::; n ) denote the equilibrium output of …rm j as a function of all managers'incentive weights. Note that these …rst-order conditions also determine the aggregate best response of other …rms to a change in …rm j's output
where X j = P k6 =j x k . Given the Nash equilibrium in the second stage, shareholders strategically choose their manager's incentives in the …rst stage. The …rst-order condition for …rm j can be written as
where a higher weight on sales revenue increases manager j's output choice, dx j =d j > 0. 13 The strategic e¤ect j induces deviations from pro…t-maximization. Combining the two …rst-order conditions for …rm j shows that equilibrium incentives are characterized by j c j = p 0 j (X )x j j . Whenever competition is in strategic substitutes, j < 0, …rm j's manager is given aggressive incentives for sales revenue with j > 0. This induces the manager to expand output beyond the pro…t-maximizing level, thus reducing pro…t margins and increasing social surplus.
Welfare losses
Incentives based on sales revenue induce parallel, outward shifts in …rms'best response curves without changing their slopes. To see why, note from (8) that the strategic e¤ect j depends only on the second-order properties of the other managers'objective functions, k (k 6 = j). Firm k's marginal revenue is simply marginal pro…t plus marginal cost, @R k =@x k = @ k =@x k + c k . Thus, its objective function k inherits the strategic properties of the underlying pro…t function k , and the slopes of …rms'best responses curves are exactly the same as in a standard Cournot model. 14 With linear demand, the strategic e¤ect from (8) becomes
Note that < 0, so competition is indeed in strategic substitutes (and so incentive contracts place positive weight on sales revenue, j > 0 for all j), and also that is a constant that is common to all …rms. Any asymmetries in unit costs or product quality thus also only a¤ect the levels but not the slopes of best responses. Finally, observe that ! 1 as the number of …rms grows large -intuitively, there is more scope for strategic manipulation with more …rms in the market.
Using the pro…tability index j ( j c j ) and j = , the …rst-order condition for manager j's incentives from (9) can be written more compactly as
In the incentive equilibrium, …rm j produces more output than …rm k (x j x k ) if and only if it has a higher pro…tability index ( j k ). So the …rm with the highest market share max also has the highest pro…tability index max . The underlying logic works in reverse too: Firms with higher market shares -as observed empirically -have higher product quality and/or lower unit costs.
Welfare losses in the incentive equilibrium can now be determined using the model's three key components: The welfare function from (4), the equilibrium conditions from (11), and the strategic e¤ect from (10).
Proposition 1 Equilibrium welfare losses
where n is the number of …rms in the industry, max is the market share of the largest …rm, and H P n j=1 2 j is the industry's Her…ndahl index.
Proof. Summing the n …rst-order conditions from (11) and rearranging yields equilibrium industry output
Plugging this back into the …rst-order condition gives …rm j's equilibrium output
so …rm j's market share
Using this, …rm j's pro…tability index can, in equilibrium, be written as
Now using (12), (13) and (15) in the expression for social welfare from (4) yields
where H P n j=1 2 j is the industry's Her…ndahl index. From (5), …rst-best social welfare W F B = (s=2) 2 max , and, using (15),
so
Since, from (10), the strategic e¤ect = (1 n 1 ), it follows that welfare losses
as claimed.
Equilibrium welfare losses depend only on three variables: The number of …rms in the industry (n), the market share of the largest …rm ( max ), and the Her…ndahl index (H). These industry data are often readily available to the analyst, making it straightforward to put the formula into practice and estimate welfare losses for a particular market. For instance, observing the vector of market shares f 1 ; 2 ; :::; n g is su¢ cient to be able to compute welfare losses.
Note also what welfare losses do not depend on: First, conditional on …rms'market shares, welfare losses do not depend on the pro…tability indices (the j s), that is, on product qualities ( j s) or on …rms' unit costs (the c j s);
Second, a change in market size (s) also does not a¤ect the welfare loss. All else equal, a market that is twice as large doubles both …rst-best and equilibrium social welfare, so their ratio and hence the (percentage) welfare loss are unchanged;
Third, welfare losses also do not depend on the (equilibrium) incentive weights from managers'contacts (the j s). 15 What matters in equilibrium is only the strategic e¤ect which in turn depends only on the number of …rms in the industry. Welfare losses are thus independent of (equilibrium) price elasticities of demand.
Symmetric …rms
The properties of the formula for welfare losses are most easily explored by initially examining the case with symmetric …rms before turning to the impact of …rm asymmetry.
With symmetry, product quality j = (so the industry demand curve p(X) = X=s) and unit cost c j = c (for all j), so social welfare
Proposition 2 If …rms in the industry are symmetric (have identical unit costs and product quality), then equilibrium welfare losses
2 (i) are always less than 4% (for any n 2); (ii) are less than 1% whenever there are at least three …rms (if n 3).
Proof. The formula is obtained by setting max = 1=n and H = 1=n in the expression for L (n; max ; H) from Proposition 1 and rearranging terms. Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition follow by inspection.
The result shows that delegation of decision-making to managers with strategic incentive contracts has a signi…cant impact on market performance:
In a symmetric duopoly, for example, equilibrium welfare losses are only 4 percent. In other words, 96 percent of the maximum possible social surplus is realized even in a highly concentrated market with only two sellers. With at least three …rms, the loss is always than 1 percent, so over 99 percent of maximum welfare is achieved.
By comparison, the welfare loss due to monopoly (by setting n = 1) is large at L sym (1) = 25%. So, put di¤erently, the entry of the second …rm eliminates 84 percent of the deadweight loss due to imperfect competition, and the entry of the third …rm brings this …gure up to 96 percent. The social value of these …rst few entrants is therefore very high.
Amongst other things, this result closely matches the empirical …nding of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) that entry beyond a third …rm has virtually no further e¤ect on the competitiveness of a market. 16 The reason here is that an additional …rm not only reduces price due to the standard entry e¤ect, but also intensi…es competition indirectly because it enhances the strategic e¤ect of delegation. As a rule of thumb, welfare losses with symmetry are of order 1=n 4 , and thus vanish extremely quickly. Compared to pro…t-maximization, n "sales-maximizing" …rms under delegation act like n 2 pro…t-maximizing …rms would under Cournot competition, so the industry is much more competitive.
Asymmetric …rms
Welfare losses are higher when …rms are asymmetric. With homogeneous products, for instance, cost e¢ ciency requires all industry output to be produced by the …rm with the lowest unit costs. As pointed out by Farrell and Shapiro (1990) , Lahiri and Ono (1988) and others, this is typically not the case in Cournot-style markets. Similarly, with vertically di¤erentiated products -but symmetric costs -maximizing social surplus requires all industry output to be supplied by the …rm with the highest-quality product. (Again, the standard Cournot equilibrium is ine¢ cient in that low-quality …rms have too large market shares.) More generally, the …rm with the highest pro…tability index max would need to supply all output at a price equal to its unit cost.
With equilibrium incentives, however, an additional e¢ ciency e¤ect arises compared to pro…t-maximization: Since competition is more intense under delegation, lower-cost/higher-quality …rms capture higher market shares than under Cournot competition. Put di¤erently, for a high-cost/low-quality …rm to sustain a given market share, its disadvantage relative to other …rms must be smaller under delegation. This e¤ect very signi…cantly limits welfare losses due to …rm asymmetry.
The following result characterizes the limiting cases.
Proposition 3 Equilibrium welfare losses L (n; max ; H) (i) are bounded above by 14 2 7
% for any n 2 (where this bound is tight for an asymmetric duopoly with n = 2 and max = 4 5 ); (ii) are lower than welfare losses due to a monopoly (where n = 1); (iii) tend to zero as the number of …rms grows large (as n ! 1).
Proof. See the appendix.
The market structure that maximizes welfare losses for Cournot competition (with linear demand) involves a dominant …rm with 50 percent market share together with a long tail of small, high-cost …rms with in…nitesimal market shares (see Corchón, 2008) . This constellation leads to a welfare loss of 33 1 3 percent which even exceeds the deadweight loss of 25 percent due to monopoly. By contrast, with strategic incentives, welfare losses for this market structure are (approximately) zero! Proposition 3(ii) and 3(iii) show that welfare losses with equilibrium incentives are always lower than for a monopoly, and always tend to zero as the number of …rms grows large. The reason is again that more …rms increase the scope for strategic manipulation (as the strategic e¤ect ! 1). So the "trick" from Cournot competition of adding a long tail of ine¢ cient …rms to generate very high welfare losses does not work. The result thus restores the traditional view that monopoly is the worst possible outcome from a social standpoint -and the intuition that "many …rms"is best.
Proposition 3(i) provides a theoretical upper bound on welfare losses in incentive equilibrium of 14 2 7 percent, while allowing for arbitrary asymmetries in …rms' product qualities and unit costs. The bound is tight for an asymmetric duopoly in which the larger …rm has a market share of 80 percent. Of course, this upper bound is signi…cantly higher than the deadweight loss with symmetric …rms -although it is also still much lower than the monopoly loss of 25 percent.
Welfare losses tend to be highest for an industry with only few players in which …rm asymmetry takes a particular form: The leading …rm has a large -but not too large -market share and the remaining n 1 …rms are symmetric.
To understand why, observe that welfare losses L (n; max ; H) from Proposition 1 are decreasing in the Her…ndahl index. Conditional on the number of …rms and the largest market share, more concentration is bene…cial since it implies greater cost e¢ ciency (and/or a higher average product quality). This means that welfare losses are highest if the n 1 non-leading …rms have exactly symmetric market shares.
Furthermore, it is clear that a substantial welfare loss requires that the largest …rm's market share is well above average. However, a very high max also implies reduced allocative ine¢ ciency -since then almost all output is produced by the "strongest"…rm (with pro…tability index max ). Speci…cally, the proof of Proposition 3 shows that the largest market share that maximizes welfare losses ], where 80 percent is for the duopoly case and ? max falls to around 43 percent as the number of …rms increases.
As a numerical example, consider a four-…rm industry in which the observed market shares are 1 = 40%, 2 = 30%, 3 = 20%, and 4 = 10%. So the largest market share max = 40% and the industry's Her…ndahl index H = 30%. This easily quali…es as a "highly concentrated market"according to the guidelines of the U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission. 17 Using the formula from Proposition 1, equilibrium welfare losses L = 6 121
, or just below 5 percent. By comparison, deadweight losses for this market structure under Cournot competition would be more than three times as large at above 18 percent. 18 Aghion and Schankerman (2004) note that the typical value of the Her…ndahl index averaged across industries is about 10% for the U.S. and several industrializing countries. Ali, Klasa and Yeung (2009) report an average Her…ndahl index of 6.4% for four-digit SIC industries using the U.S. Census of Manufactures over the period 1982 to 2002. These …gures imply a (very weak) upper bound on max of around 25-35% (since certainly max < p H). Note also that a combined market share of no more than 35 percent for merging …rms is often considered to be a "safe harbour" under the 1992 U.S. guidelines (see §2.211).
The following result shows that such an upper bound on max is su¢ cient for equilibrium welfare losses to be "small." 18 For example, using the results from Section 4 of Corchón (2008) . More generally, the formulae from the present analysis, in conjunction with those from Anderson and Renault (2003) and Corchón (2008) , can be used to compare numerically welfare losses in incentive equilibrium with Cournot competition. n 3 …rms), then equilibrium welfare losses L (n; max ; H) are less than approximately 4 2 3 %.
Taken together, the results show that, with equilibrium incentives, welfare losses due to imperfect competition are likely to be small for many empirically relevant market structures -despite signi…cant …rm asymmetry and industry concentration. 19 In particular, welfare losses are bounded above by 5 percent if either (i) …rms' unit costs and product qualities are su¢ ciently similar (Proposition 2), or (ii) if there are su¢ ciently many …rms in the industry (Proposition 3), or (iii) if the largest …rm's market share is su¢ ciently small (Proposition 2 and Proposition 4). Note especially that none of these statements are valid, in general, for Cournot competition with pro…t-maximizing …rms.
Further applications
Propositions 1 to 4 also apply to strategically equivalent settings with (A) competition between oligopsonists, and (B) strategic forward trading.
(A) Competition between oligopsonists. The above results apply equally to oligopsonistic markets in which managers pursue strategic incentives. For example, bank deposit markets are a natural application in that they often involve localized competition between a relatively small number of banks with largely homogeneous products. Moreover, deposit-taking is one of the core business activities of commercial banks, and there is a strong policy interest in market structure and competition in the banking sector following the 2007-9 …nancial crisis. Following Klein (1971) , Hannan and Berger (1991) and others, consider the following simple model in which n 2 commercial banks compete for customer deposits. Bank j has unit cost c j , takes deposit volume D j , and has market share j = D j =D (where D P n j=1 D j is total deposits). As above, let max max j j denote the highest market share.
On the supply side, consumer (dis-)utility U (D 1 ; :::; D n ) = P n j=1 j D j +D 2 =2s.
Letting r j denote bank j's deposit rate, utility maximization yields an inverse supply curve r j (D) = j +D=s for bank j. Suppose further that bank j invests its customers'
19 Numerical calculations also con…rm that somewhat larger welfare losses in the double digits are possible only in asymmetric duopoly and triopoly settings where the largest …rm's market share is su¢ ciently close to deposits to yield an expected return j .
20 Let j j j c j > 0 denote a pro…tability index for bank j, and also let max max j j . All else equal, a bank is more pro…table if it has better investment opportunities (higher j ), more favourable deposit supply (lower j ), or lower unit costs (lower c j ).
Banks'shareholders delegate decision-making to their managers, and manager j maximizes j = (1 j ) j + j Y j , a combination of pro…ts j = j r j c j D j and gross income Y j = j D j . Social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus, and can be written as
The key point is that this setting is strategically equivalent to the model of Section 2, with …rms'outputs replaced by banks'deposits and a simple reinterpretation of the pro…tability indices. First-best has the bank with the highest pro…tability index taking all deposits D F B = s max (at an interest rate equal to its own investment rate minus its unit costs), so …rst-best social welfare W F B = (s=2) 2 max . Aggressive incentives (with higher j ) here, too, induce parallel, outward shifts in bank manager j's best response curve as de…ned by the …rst-order condition
Let D j ( 1 ; :::; n ) denote manager j's equilibrium deposit choice as a function of all managers'incentive weights. As above, these …rst-order conditions also determine the strategic e¤ect
Given this, the shareholders of bank j choose their manager's incentives according to
where dD j =d j > 0. With the linear supply structure, it is easy to check that j =
(1 n 1 ) , so competition between banks is again in strategic substitutes. Using the pro…tability index j j j c j and j = , the …rst-order condition from (22) can be rewritten as
Observe that this equilibrium condition, the welfare function, and the strategic 20 These investments could represent a combination of interbank market loans to other …nancial institutions and the portfolio of securities held on the balance sheet. For simplicity, the model focuses on welfare losses in the deposit market, without explicitly accounting for other markets.
e¤ect are all equivalent to the previous analysis. Thus, the formula for welfare losses from Proposition 1 also applies to this model, as do Propositions 2 to 4. With strategic incentives, therefore, welfare losses due to oligopsony are less than 5 percent under the conditions previously identi…ed.
(B) Strategic forward trading. The above propositions also apply to the seminal model of strategic forward trading due to Allaz and Vila (1993) . In contrast to above, …rms are assumed to be pro…t-maximizers, but there is scope for strategic commitment via positions taken in the forward market. The impact of forward trading on market performance has recently received much attention, particularly in restructured electricity markets. For example, Bushnell et al. (2008) …nd that a Cournot model augmented with forward contracting commitments performs well in simulations of market outcomes in three restructured U.S. electricity markets.
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In the …rst period of Allaz and Vila (1993) , …rms can buy or sell contracts in the forward market for delivery of a good. In the second period, …rms produce under Cournot competition in the spot market, given the forward market positions previously entered into. The forward market is e¢ cient with the no-arbitrage condition that, in equilibrium, the forward price equals the spot price.
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Their model can be cast into the above framework as follows. The industry parameters are exactly as in Section 2, while …rms produce a homogeneous good facing a linear inverse demand curve p(X) = X=s. Social welfare is the sum of consumer and producer surplus W (x 1 ; :::; x n ) = P n j=1 j x j X 2 =2s, with j ( c j ) > 0 as the pro…tability index for …rm j. (This generalizes Allaz and Vila's (1993) model to n 2 …rms and asymmetric unit costs. 23 )
Let y j denote …rm j's sales in the forward market, and let p F denote the forward price. In the second period, given its forward market position y j , …rm j maximizes the objective function
since revenue accrues only on the (x j y j ) non-committed units of production. The 21 Bushnell et al. (2008) analyze a model in which electricity …rms compete in both a wholesale spot market and a retail market, and …rms'retail positions play a formally identical role to longterm forward commitments. 22 Forward contracts are assumed to be binding and observable, and there is no discounting. Note also that speculators make zero pro…ts in the no-arbitrage equilibrium.
23 Allaz and Vila (1993) do not incorporate capacity constraints, which may exacerbate …rms' market power. Conversely, they show that additional periods of forward contracting magnify the strategic e¤ect, so welfare losses will generally be even lower in such cases. associated …rst-order condition
implicitly de…nes …rm j's best response in the spot market. Let x j (y 1 ; :::; y n ) denote its output choice as a function of all forward positions. These …rst-order conditions again determine the strategic e¤ect j dX j =dx j (where X j = P k6 =j x k ). With linear demand, j = (1 n 1 ) , so competition is in strategic substitutes, exactly as above.
In the …rst period, …rm j's total pro…ts are given by
where the …rst term re ‡ects operating pro…ts, and the second term re ‡ects forwardmarket pro…ts. In equilibrium, the latter term is zero with an e¢ cient forward market (for which p F = p). So …rm j's equilibrium pro…ts j = (p c j )x j , and it chooses its forward market position according to
where dx j =dy j > 0 (so more forward sales make …rm j more aggressive in the spot market). Using the pro…tability index j ( c j ) and j = , this …rst-order condition can be written as
This shows that Allaz and Vila's (1993) two-period forward trading model is also strategically equivalent to the model of Section 2. Although forward contracts may seem quite di¤erent from managerial incentives, they here induce exactly the same product-market outcomes because they share the same underlying strategic properties.
Of course, it is well-known that forward sales make competition between …rms more aggressive and improve market performance. However, much of the existing empirical literature on deregulated electricity markets focuses on estimating pricecost margins (Lerner indices) as a proxy for welfare losses due to market power. Propositions 1 to 4 go further by directly quantifying the welfare impact and showing that equilibrium welfare losses under forward trading are less than 5 percent under the conditions previously identi…ed.
The framework presented in this paper also clari…es the extent to which …rms engage in strategic forward trading. In particular, combining the two …rst-order conditions from (25) and (27), and setting j = , shows that …rm j's equilibrium forward market position satis…es
Thus, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium, each …rm sells forward the same proportion of its output. Since 2 [ ; 1) for any n 2, this proportion lies between 50 percent (for a duopoly) and 100 percent (as the number of …rms grows large). 24 This …nding is broadly consistent with restructured electricity markets in which contract cover is often 80 percent or more (see, e.g., Green, 1999 and Sweeting, 2007) .
Extensions
This section discusses three extensions of the benchmark model from Section 2. First, on the demand side, a consumer utility function that leads to non-linear demand curves. Second, on the supply side, a …xed setup cost incurred by …rms that have entered the market. Third, some general results on welfare losses that apply with non-linear demand, …xed setup costs, and a generalized welfare function. To my best knowledge, this section provides the …rst solution to a model of strategic incentives with asymmetric …rms and a non-linear demand system. The three extensions draw upon formulae contained in the proof of Proposition 5 in the appendix (which contains a full set of derivations for the general model).
Consistent with the benchmark model, this section considers situations where the vector of …rms'market shares is observed by the analyst -and thus is invariant to changes in the details of model speci…cation. For example, although a change in demand curvature will generally lead to changes in …rms'implied (yet unobserved) pro…tability indices -and also in equilibrium welfare losses -it does not alter …rms'observed market shares (or the observed number of …rms in the industry).
25 24 This also makes clear that …rms would become forward buyers in a setting with competition in strategic complements (that is, > 0). See also Mahenc and Salanié (2004) who make a related point in a model of di¤erentiated-products Bertrand competition. 25 This contrasts with the usual theoretical approach of initially specifying …rms'demands and costs, and then deriving equilibrium entry, market shares, prices, welfare, and so on, for a particular model of competition. Instead, with a view to empirical implementation, my approach starts with the observed number of …rms and their market shares, then implicitly works "backwards" to …nd the implied pro…tability indices, and thus calculates equilibrium welfare losses.
My approach therefore also allows comparisons between equilibria with strategic incentives and standard Cournot competition for a given, empirically observed, market structure.
A Non-linear demand
Consider the benchmark model from Section 2 with a more general consumer utility function U (x 1 ; :::;
so the inverse demand curve for …rm j becomes p j (X) = j X =s.
As before, j is a measure of demand for …rm j's product (e.g., its quality) and s > 0 is a measure of market size. In addition, is an index of demand curvature: Demand is convex (concave) if 1 ( 1), and higher values of correspond to "more concave"demand.
Many familiar demand curves are nested as special cases of this formulation. For example, it includes all four demand speci…cations used by Genesove and Mullin (1998) in an in ‡uential empirical study of the U.S. sugar industry. In particular,
, (iii) is exponential in the limit as ! 0 (for which p j (X) = j log(X)=s), and (iv) has constant elasticity of 1= > 0 if j = 0 (for all j) and s < 0.
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Demand is not too convex in that > j =(1 j ) (for j = 1; 2 with n = 2), and > 1 for n 3. These assumptions are necessary and su¢ cient for competition between …rms to be in strategic substitutes (i.e., the strategic e¤ect j < 0 for all j) for any distribution of …rms'market shares. They also ensure that consumer surplus S = U (x 1 ; :::; x n ) P n j=1 p j x j is well-behaved and …nite. Social welfare, the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, is given by
So …rst-best social welfare involves industry output X F B = (s max ) 1= and thus
Observe that the two …rst-order conditions from (7) and (9) in Section 3 are valid also for non-linear demand. Using the …rst-order condition for manager j's output choice, @ j =@x j = 0, it is straightforward to calculate the generalized strategic e¤ect
With non-linear demand, therefore, the strategic e¤ect di¤ers across …rms (so j 6 = k for j 6 = k); it is more negative for larger (smaller) …rms if demand is concave (convex). Note that, in general, j is more negative for a more concave demand curve (that is, j declines as increases). Moreover, the strategic e¤ect j ! 1 either if the number of …rms grows large, n ! 1 (as in the benchmark model), or if demand becomes very concave, ! 1.
The …rst-order condition for …rm j's choice of incentives, d j =d j = 0, can be written as
Welfare losses can again be determined using the model's three key components: The welfare function from (32), the equilibrium conditions from (35), and the strategic e¤ects from (34).
Symmetric …rms. The formula for welfare losses is again relatively simple if …rms are symmetric in terms of their unit costs and product qualities, L sym (n; ) = 1 1 + ( + 1) n 2 (n 1) (1 ) 1 + n 2 (n 1)(1 )
Table 1 presents numerical results for a variety of demand speci…cations, including the four used by Genesove and Mullin (1998) . The two most convex demand curves are those with constant elasticity, one as the limiting case with unit-elasticity ( ! 1) and the other with a price elasticity of two ( = 1 2 ). The next three demand curves, exponential ( ! 0), quadratic ( = 1 2 ), and linear ( = 1), are all convex (at least weakly). Finally, I also present welfare losses for three strictly concave demand curves: Two moderately concave demand curves ( = 2 and = 3), as well as the limiting case where demand becomes rectangular ( ! 1).
These results are quantitatively similar to those for the linear case from Proposition 2 (with = 1), while allowing for a much more general class of demand functions. It turns out that welfare losses are maximized at approximately 4 1 2 percent for a duopoly with exponential demand (that is, n = 2 and ! 0). They are less than approximately 1 percent for any industry with three or more symmetric …rms.
As expected, market performance improves as the number of …rms increases, and it is clear that the rule of thumb that symmetric welfare losses are of order 1=n 4 is robust to di¤erent demand speci…cations. With symmetric …rms, equilibrium welfare losses are therefore bounded above by 5 percent for any number of …rms and any demand curvature. Moreover, they tend to zero under any of the following conditions: (i) The number of …rms grows large (as n ! 1), or (ii) demand becomes very convex (as ! 1), or (iii) demand becomes very concave (as ! 1). Asymmetric …rms. Welfare losses can again be signi…cantly higher when …rms are asymmetric. In particular, with non-linear demand, equilibrium welfare losses L (n; max ; e H; ) = 1
is the industry's adjusted Her…ndahl index. With non-linear demand, welfare losses again depend on the number of …rms in the market (n) and the largest …rm's market share ( max ). However, they now also depend on demand curvature ( ), as well as on the entire vector of market shares, f 1 ; 2 ; :::; n g. In contrast to the case with linear demand, the standard Her…ndahl index is no longer a su¢ cient statistic for the distribution of market shares.
28
By inspection, welfare losses tend to zero as (i) the number of …rms grows large (as n ! 1) or (ii) demand becomes very convex (as ! 1). The …rst point con…rms the basic insight from the benchmark model that "many …rms" leads to the socially optimal outcome in a setting with strategic incentives. The second point is important because it shows that, despite …rm asymmetries, welfare losses with a convex demand curve must -at least in some cases -be smaller than they are for linear demand.
Observe that equilibrium welfare losses L (n; max ; ; e H) with non-linear demand are decreasing in the adjusted Her…ndahl index, e H. As with linear demand, therefore, higher concentration is bene…cial as it implies greater e¢ ciency (conditional on the number of …rms and the largest …rm's market share).
29 So welfare losses are again highest if the n 1 non-leading …rms have exactly symmetric market shares. Table 2 thus explores the impact of demand curvature using numerical results for an industry in which the largest …rm has a market share of 35 percent and the remaining …rms are symmetric. Further numerical calculations con…rm that, as expected, these are maximal welfare losses -losses are always lower than in Table  2 if the largest …rm's market share is less than 35% (for a given number of …rms).
These results show that the 5 percent upper bound on welfare losses extends well beyond the benchmark case with linear demand. In particular, maximal welfare losses are uniformly lower than this for any convex demand curve (with 1) and also for very slightly concave demand ( ' 1). So the bound applies to all four demand speci…cations considered by Genesove and Mullin (1998) . These numerical results thus extend Proposition 4 from the benchmark model to settings with nonlinear demand curves. 28 The reason is that the strategic e¤ect j varies across …rms, so each individual …rm's characteristics now play a role in determining the equilibrium level of industry output. 29 The adjusted Her…ndahl index shares the property that it is increasing and convex in individual …rm's market shares with the standard Her…ndahl index. In particular, straightforward calculations show that
Welfare losses are partially above this bound for the two moderately concave demand curves ( = 2 and = 3), for which welfare losses range approximately from 2 percent to 7 percent for the most relevant numbers of …rms. (It is worth recalling that these are maximal welfare losses; any asymmetry among smaller …rms implies smaller losses.) Table 2 also shows that it is possible for welfare losses with asymmetric …rms to be much higher if …rms'demand curves are strongly concave. In such cases, welfare losses are in the double digits for a wide range of market structures, and may be as high as in the low 20s. However, it is somewhat di¢ cult to judge the empirical relevance of these cases as such demand speci…cations -although theoretically admissible -are only very rarely used in applied work. 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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In sum, for demand curves commonly used in empirical work, equilibrium welfare losses are typically similar to -or often lower than -welfare losses with linear demand. With symmetric …rms, the rule of thumb that welfare losses are of order 1=n 4 applies generally. The 5 percent upper bound on welfare losses also extends well beyond the linear case. However, welfare losses may be signi…cantly higher in situations where …rms' demand curves are su¢ ciently concave and there is a particular kind of asymmetry in their market shares.
B Fixed entry costs
Consider the benchmark model from Section 2 but now suppose that each …rm incurs a …xed setup cost K whenever it has entered the market. Firms are symmetric in terms of unit costs and product qualities, and the demand curve p(X) = X=s is linear. There is a large pool of potential entrants, and an active …rm j's pro…ts
Social welfare, the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, becomes
. The …rst-best outcome involves a single …rm entering the market, and producing industry output X F B = s . So …rst-best social welfare W F B = (s=2) 2 K, where the setup cost is assumed to be su¢ ciently low to allow welfare-enhancing entry of at least one …rm, K < (s=2) 2 .
Observe that the strategic e¤ect and the equilibrium conditions from the benchmark analysis in Section 3 also continue to apply in this setting. 31 The formula for welfare losses therefore only has to take into account the adverse impact associated with the duplication of …xed costs,
As expected, the result from Proposition 2 is nested for zero setup costs (K = 0), and welfare losses are increasing in the setup cost.
The main complication is that K is typically not easily observable to the analyst. However, with symmetric …rms, it is possible to derive upper and lower bounds based on …rms'entry decisions. In particular, the equilibrium pro…ts of a symmetric …rm are given by
and since the n th …rm has chosen to enter the market,
Slightly abusing notation, …rm (n + 1)'s decision not to enter implies that
For a given number of …rms in the market, the entry cost has no e¤ect on the equilibrium outcome in terms of prices and quantities. so welfare losses in free-entry equilibrium L (n; K) are bounded according to L (n; K) < L (n; K) L (n; K). Table 3 presents numerical calculations, including for K = 0 as comparison. Welfare losses can be signi…cantly higher if …rms incur …xed setup costs. The maximal welfare loss is in the double digits for duopoly and triopoly models, and, with a small number of …rms, is roughly twice as large as the minimal loss.
Nonetheless welfare losses remain below 5 percent for many market structures; this upper bound applies to minimal losses L (n; K) for n 4, and to maximal losses L (n; K) for n 6. This contrasts sharply with standard Cournot competition, for which the range of possible welfare losses with n = 6 is given by 18:2 to 23:4 percent, and for which the number of …rms needed for welfare losses to be less than 5 percent in free-entry equilibrium is n 38.
32
Of course, the notion of …rst-best is stronger with a setup cost than in the benchmark model. First, the regulator is assumed to control …rms'pricing behaviour as well as their entry behaviour. Second, the single producing …rm now has negative operating pro…ts (since price lies below average cost). So it is implicit that the regulator can compensate the …rm with a transfer payment -but without creating any additional distortions or ine¢ ciency. 32 For example, using the results from Section 3 of Corchón (2008) .
Moreover, although standard in the literature (see, e.g., Mankiw and Whinston, 1986, and Corchón, 2008) , it is clear that the assumption that …rms are completely symmetric (in terms of marginal cost, product quality, and …xed cost) is rather strong. As emphasized by Vickers (1995) , this symmetry assumption deprives competition of one of its most basic functions -selecting the most e¢ cient …rms. It also means that these models cannot replicate an observed distribution of …rms'market shares f 1 ; 2 ; :::; n g that almost certainly involves asymmetries.
A richer model allows for heterogenous unit costs and product qualities, while retaining the assumption that the …xed cost is identical across …rms, so …rst-best welfare W F B = (s=2) 2 max K. The maximum setup cost K is pinned down by the …rm with the smallest market share, min min j j < n 1 , which also makes the smallest pro…t,
Since this …rm has decided to enter the market,
The key observation is that the maximum entry cost K is of the order of 2 min . So the market presence of a …rm with a "small"market share -even as high as 5 or 10 percent -implies a rather low value for K. This in turn means that welfare losses are not much above those from the benchmark analysis with a zero entry cost.
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Using the last expression for K shows that equilibrium welfare losses with asymmetric …rms and a …xed setup cost are thus bounded by
2 min L (n; max ; min ; H).
So Proposition 4 also applies, with slight modi…cations, to the case with …xed entry costs. In particular, welfare losses are below 5 percent if the largest …rm's market share is no greater than 35 percent and (i) the smallest …rm's market share is su¢ ciently small or (ii) the number of …rms in the industry is su¢ ciently large.
In sum, …xed costs generally increase equilibrium welfare losses, possibly by a signi…cant amount. With symmetric …rms, the 5 percent upper bound on welfare losses still applies in free-entry equilibrium if there are at least four to six …rms in the market. With asymmetric …rms, the impact of the setup cost remains modest essentially if the smallest …rm in the industry is su¢ ciently small.
C General results
This last extension considers a more general model that combines the features of the two preceding extensions. On the demand side, the consumer utility function from (30) yields a non-linear demand curve p j (X) = j X =s for …rm j. On the supply side, …rm j has pro…tability index j ( j c j ), and pro…ts j = (p j c j ) x j K (with equilibrium pro…ts j 0). The generalized welfare function
where S is consumer surplus, and 2 [0; 1] is the weight placed on producer surplus. A total surplus standard, as in the above analysis, corresponds to = 1; a consumer welfare standard is given by = 0. The generalized welfare loss is de…ned as
I continue to associate the …rst-best outcome with the …rm with highest profitability index max producing where p j (X F B ) = c j , and so
Again, the setup cost is su¢ ciently low that
the …rst-best consumer surplus. Note that the equilibrium conditions and strategic e¤ects derived in Extension A for non-linear demand also apply in this generalized setup.
Proposition 5 Generalized equilibrium welfare losses b L (n; max ; e H; ; K=S ; ) = 1
is the industry's adjusted Her…ndahl index, and
is equilibrium consumer surplus.
(The formulae for equilibrium welfare losses used in Extensions A and B are nested as special cases of Proposition 5.) Unsurprisingly, the informational requirements for estimating welfare losses are now stronger. Compared with the benchmark model, the additional parameters are (i) the weighting on producer surplus in the regulator's welfare function , (ii) the entire vector of …rms'market shares f 1 ; 2 ; :::; n g, (iii) an assumption, estimate, or bounds for demand curvature , and (iv) an assumption, estimate, or bounds for the ratio of the setup cost to equilibrium consumer surplus K=S .
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Given its complexity, welfare losses in this generalized model are perhaps best examined on a case-by-case basis using the actual distribution of market shares from a real-world industry. But the above discussion shows that, in principle, such estimation is feasible (and straightforward) in a practical setting.
I now examine some of the limiting properties of generalized welfare losses. The key step is to recognize that they can be bounded above as follows:
So, for any weight on producer surplus 2 [0; 1] and any …xed cost K 0, generalized welfare losses are no greater than welfare losses in terms of consumer surplus,
34 It is again possible to derive a maximum setup cost using the smallest …rm's decision to enter the market because it makes non-negative pro…ts,
where the right-hand side consists only of parameters for which information or estimates are otherwise already available. (It is easy to check that, as before, a …rm with a smaller market share j makes lower equilibrium pro…ts j in the generalized model.)
Since equilibrium consumer surplus relative to its …rst best is given by
the next proposition follows.
Proposition 6 Part (i) shows that the …nding from previous numerical simulations is general: Welfare losses tend to zero if either the number of …rms grows large or if demand becomes very convex. So, importantly, generalized welfare losses with convex demand must, over some range, be lower than in the benchmark case with linear demand.
Part (ii) shows that losses never exceed the largest …rm's market share. This result holds across a wide range of models -including all the special cases examined above -and also if the welfare standard is geared towards consumers (with < 1). The general result is, of course, also weaker because the largest market share in an industry is often 20 percent, 30 percent, or higher.
Perhaps the key observation, however, is that welfare losses are not "arbitrary" in this generalized model. In other words, they can not be made arbitrarily close to 100 percent by appropriate choice of parameter values (since max < 1, and, indeed often max << 1). This again stands in sharp contrast to the standard model of Cournot competition with pro…t-maximizing …rms, for which Corchón (2008) shows that welfare losses are indeed arbitrary in some cases.
Two …nal points arise from the fact that the upper bound on generalized welfare losses b L ( ) 1 S =S F B places zero weight on industry pro…ts:
First, Proposition 6 may also apply if the …xed setup cost is allowed to vary across …rms as K j . Suppose that the …rst-best outcome still has the …rm with max producing where p j (X F B ) = c j . Then it is easy to check that the argument from (39) that b L ( ) 1 S =S F B still holds. Of course, the lower bound on S =S F B is independent of the K j s, so b L ( ) max continues to apply.
Second, the upper bound on welfare losses b L ( ) max thus also holds if some -or indeed all -industry pro…ts have been dissipated in form of socially wasteful rent-seeking activities to gain market power (see, e.g., Posner, 1975) .
Concluding remarks
Corporate managers and executive compensation in many industries place signi…-cant emphasis on measures of …rm size. A model that incorporates such objectives may thus, in some cases, provide a better re ‡ection of industry behaviour than a standard model with pro…t-maximizing …rms. This paper has analyzed welfare losses due to imperfect competition where managers pursue strategic incentives based on sales revenue. 35 The framework presented also applies to a range of strategically equivalent settings, including competition between oligopsonists (e.g., for retail bank deposits) and strategic forward trading (e.g., in restructured electricity markets).
The results show that, with equilibrium incentives, welfare losses due to imperfect competition are likely to be less than 5 percent for many empirically relevant market structures. Even a relatively small number of …rms can be su¢ cient to yield almost fully competitive outcomes. Their large impact on market performance suggests that …rms' strategic incentives may also deserve more attention in antitrust policy, perhaps most notably in merger analysis. In contrast to existing empirical approaches, welfare losses can be estimated using only observable information on …rms'market shares (together with an assumption, estimate, or bounds for demand curvature).
What could generate larger welfare losses in industries where managers pursue …rm size objectives? First, welfare losses can be signi…cantly higher than 5 percent if …rms'demand curves are strongly concave and their market shares are asymmetric in a particular way (see Extension A). Second, losses may also be higher if there are signi…cant …xed costs and "excess entry"relative to …rst-best (see Extension B). Third, a welfare standard based on consumer surplus -rather than social surplus 35 The other incentive contract considered in the recent literature on delegation is based on a combination of pro…ts and market share. (Jansen, van Lier and van Witteloostuijn (2007) and Ritz (2008) show that market share contracts dominate incentives based on sales revenue in a three-stage game in which symmetric oligopolists can initially choose between di¤erent contracts in the additional stage.) For the simple case of a symmetric duopoly with linear demand, Ritz (2008) shows that the strategic e¤ect = 1 p 2 . Using this in the above framework yields that equilibrium welfare losses L = p 2 1 = 2 p 2 1 2 , or about 4 1 2 percent. This suggests that the results are likely to be very similar to Proposition 2 above. Based on this, I conjecture that, in general, welfare losses tend to be somewhat -but probably not much -higher with market share contracts. It also seems likely that the limiting cases under which welfare losses go to zero (from part (i) of Proposition 6) should continue to apply with market share incentives.
as in the related literature -would also generate higher losses (see Extension C). Fourth, higher losses may also be the result of collusive agreements between …rms in a dynamic model (where managerial incentives might also a¤ect cartel stability). 36 Finally, it is clear that welfare losses could be substantially higher if …rms'products are also signi…cantly horizontally di¤erentiated.
is the highest possible welfare loss for a duopoly, and the second step then shows that welfare losses for n 2 always satisfy L 1 7
. For the …rst step, in the duopoly case with n = 2, the Her…ndahl index H = satis…es ' 0 ( max ) = 0. Since ' 00 ( max ) < 0, it follows that L ( )j n=2
. For the second step, note that L (n; max ; H) is decreasing in H. Since the Her…ndahl index 
36 See Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) for an analysis of the incentive to collude in a repeated game with strategic incentives. I am not aware of any work on collusion under delegation with asymmetric …rms. 37 For instance, if products are almost fully horizontally di¤erentiated, …rms act almost like independent monopolists (and there is only very little scope for strategic manipulation), so welfare losses are also close to monopoly levels. See also Corchón and Zudenkova (2009). it follows that L (n; max ; H) L (n; max ; H). (Note also that this holds with equality for n = 2.) Replacing H with H in the formula for welfare losses from Proposition 1 and some rearranging shows that L (n; max ; H) 2). Part (iii) of the proposition can be seen by rewriting the formula for welfare losses from Proposition 1 as L (n; max ; H) = ( max =n) 2 + 2 ( max =n H=n)
and, noting that max 2 [ 1 n ; 1) and H 2 [ 1 n ; 1) are both bounded, it follows that lim n!1 L (n; max ; H) = 0,
Proof of Proposition 4. Equilibrium welfare losses L (n; max ; H) are decreasing in H, and the Her…ndahl index H 2 max + (1 max ) 2 =(n 1) H, so L (n; max ; H) L (n; max ; H). From the proof of Proposition 2, L (n; max ; H) L (n; ], it follows that L (n; max ; H) L (n; . Replacing H with H in the formula for welfare losses from Proposition 1 and some rearranging shows that L (n; max ; H) = (n 1) 2 max + 2n(n max 1)(1 max ) (n 1)(n + max ) 2
and so L (n; 
Ignoring integer constraints for a moment, it is not di¢ cult to check that L (n;
; H) is increasing (decreasing) in n for n smaller (larger) thann 5:05, so L (n; ; H) 4:56%, it follows that L (n; ; H) 4:69%, where the latter is approximately equal to 4 2 3 %. Therefore L (n; max ; H) L (n; max ; H) L (n; as claimed.
Proof of Proposition 5. With non-linear demand, by (34), the strategic e¤ect follows from the …rst-order condition for manager j's output choice, @ j =@x j = 0, dX j dx j = (n 1) (1 j )(1 ) n (1 j )(1 ) j < 0.
Furthermore, by (35), the …rst-order condition for …rm j's choice of incentives, 
Rearranging this shows that equilibrium industry output also satis…es (X ) = s P n j=1 j P n j=1 1 + j (1 + j )
.
Combining this with the …rst-order condition from (55) shows that the …rms'profitability indices are related by
and so also .
The remainder of the proof derives equilibrium consumer surplus, …rm and industry pro…ts, generalized welfare, …rst-best welfare, and, …nally, a formula for generalized welfare losses using these expressions.
Recalling the consumer utility function from (30) and the corresponding inverse demand curve for …rm j from (31), equilibrium consumer surplus can be written as
Now using the expressions for industry output from (57) and the strategic e¤ects from (54) yields S = ( + 1) s 
Similarly, using (54), (57), (58), (59), and (61), …rm j's pro…ts j = (p j c j ) x j K can, in equilibrium, be written as
Therefore equilibrium industry pro…ts are given by X n j=1 j = ( + 1) e H=n S nK
where
is the industry's adjusted Her…ndahl index. Taken together, the expressions for equilibrium consumer surplus and industry pro…ts imply that generalized welfare, c W ( ) = S+ P n j=1 j , in equilibrium becomes 
